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JOSEPH W. BURNS*

Antitrust Under the Treaty of Romet
Introduction
A comparison of antitrust under the Treaty of Rome with antitrust in the
United States leads to the conclusion that there are more (and very important)
differences than there are similarities. Some of the major differences will be
described in summary fashion.'
I. Definition of Antitrust Laws
In comparing the so-called antitrust laws of the EEC and the United States
our terms and the frame of reference must first be defined. The European
Economic Commission enforces three treaties. We are concerned here only with
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. We are not discussing the other
treaties or the national laws of the member countries.
A major difference between the EEC laws and United States laws is that there
is a single statute in the EEC-Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
It is a common practice in discussing the United States antitrust laws to refer
to the Sherman Act as if there was only one statute to consider. However, in
fact, the very definition of the term "antitrust laws" has been the subject of
disagreement. Since the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, Congress has
enacted more than seventy so-called antitrust statutes. The United States
Supreme Court has split five to four in defining "antitrust" statutes. Thus, the
majority has ruled that Sections 1 and 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act were antitrust laws, but Section 3 was not.'
The statutes mentioned do not comprise all of the antitrust laws, but are
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only the framework for a substantial body of judicial decisions and administrative adjudications. These decisions are not mere interpretations of the
statutes, but are in effect legislation, since the congressional language is vaguely
worded, and it was left to the courts and to the Federal Trade Commission to
perfect the legislative intent.
One must further consider the great number of exemptions from the antitrust
laws which apply to specified types of agreements or transactions, and to entire
industries or broad categories of activities. For example, exemptions have been
granted in the transportation field, including air, water, and land transportation, in communications, insurance, agriculture, banking, and labor.
II. Enforcement
In the United States there are two different systems of enforcement-the
courts and an administrative agency. These have concurrent jurisdiction, and
both may proceed against a company at the same time for the same conduct.
There are ninety-six district courts and eleven courts of appeals, so business
often has to live for years under conflicting court decisions until finally the
Supreme Court states what the law is.
The method of enforcement of the EEC antitrust laws can be described as
an administrative proceeding with judicial review by one court-the High Court
of Justice. The EEC Commission is broadly similar to the Federal Trade Commission, except that judicial review maybe had in any one of eleven circuit courts
of appeals, and review by the Supreme Court is not a matter of right. Often the
Supreme Court declines to review an FTC decision until conflicts arise between
circuit courts.
Another similarity between the EEC and FTC is that both Commissions have
the power to conduct investigations and hearings, to issue cease and desist
orders, and to levy fines.
But there is a substantial difference between the two systems relative to the
attitude of the respective courts to the Commission subject to their authority.
In the United States the Supreme Court almost always affirms FTC decisions.
In the EEC the High Court of Justice has not hesitated to overrule the Commission. For example, in the early days the Commission adopted the position
that Article 85(1) prohibited all appreciable restrictions of competition regardless of their market significance. However, the Court held that restraints must
be examined in their actual market context and to be prohibited must be shown
to have a significant adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.
The problem of overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction is present in the EEC
as in the United States. EEC member states which have antitrust laws may
enforce them so long as the decisions are compatible with EEC decisions or
principles. However, where national decisions prove incompatible with a Commission decision, the national authorities must respect Commission authority.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. II, No. 2
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Thus there is a measure of overlapping jurisdiction as there is in the United
States, and both the EEC and the national state may impose fines on the same
person for the same conduct. 3 Also similar to United States laws, the EEC may
impose a penalty even if the conduct would be lawful under national law.
A further major difference between the EEC and United States systems is that
enforcement of EEC decisions is entirely civil, and only against corporations.
Individuals cannot be fined or sent to jail, as they are under the Sherman Act.
Also, there is no EEC provision for private treble damage actions.
A major criticism of the Sherman Act is that businessmen are subject to
punishment ex postfacto, for conduct which was legal at the time of the acts.
When the Supreme Court declares a new rule or overrules an old decision, the
decision is applicable to everyone who engaged in such conduct before the new
decision, even though it was lawful at the time. Businessmen are thus subject
to fines, imprisonments and treble damages, retroactively.
The method of enforcement by the EEC is to endeavor to obtain compliance,
and when it has to make an interpretation of conduct as to which there was no
rule, it affords everyone an opportunity to comply.
MU. Advisory Opinions
Another complaint which American businessmen have against the United
States antitrust laws is that there is no way a businessman can ascertain in
advance whether or not a proposed course of action is legal or illegal. While the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission may confer with
United States companies, and will often insist on examining, before they become
finalized, nascent agreements that may have anti-competitive effects, neither has
authority to render a binding opinion or to approve any agreement or course of
action in advance.
The Treaty of Rome contains an exemption provision which gives the Commission the exclusive power to administer it and to grant negative clearances.
Under the Commission's procedures, parties to an agreement must notify the
Commission in order to obtain such clearance. The Commission may grant
either individual or blanket exemptions. Where blanket exemption has beer,
granted to a class of agreements, parties to such agreements are not required to
notify the Commission.'
IV. Rule of Reason-Sherman Act Section 1
Article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty is similar to Section 1 of the Sherman Act

'Wilhem v. Bundeskartellamt, 15 Recuieil de la Jurisprudence de la Court 1969-1, CCH COMM.
8056 (1969).
'Regulation 17.
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to the extent that both broadly prohibit agreements or concerted practices
which restrain trade or competition. A major difference is that Article 85(3)
provides specific exemptions if:
(a) the agreement contributes to improved production or distribution, or
to technical or economic progress;
(b) the public receives a "fair share" of the resulting gains;
(c) the restriction does not exceed what is "essential" to achieve these benefits; and
(d) it does not "eliminate competition in respect of a substantial portion of
the products in question."
These exemptions would qualify as a Rule of Reason approach. Years ago
the United States courts occasionally spoke of a Rule of Reason but it is now
seldom mentioned. It is difficult to maintain there is a Rule of Reason when
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that football is subject to the Sherman Act, but baseball is not. A Circuit Court of Appeals judge once remarked
facetiously that those Supreme Court decisions seemed to depend upon the
shape of the ball and the way it bounces. I
Nor can it be said that the United States antitrust laws protect the consumer
or the public interest when the Supreme Court has held illegal an agreement
between two parties to restrain a third party from gouging the public by charging unreasonably high prices. 6
V. Monopoly-Sherman Act Section 2
Section 2 makes attempts to monopolize and monopolization illegal. Article
86 of the Treaty does not attack monopoly or dominant position as such. It
adopts a different philosophy by prohibiting only an abuse of a dominant position. In consequence there is not likely to be any attempt in the EEC to break
up large firms like I.B.M. and A.T.&T.
In determining whether a company occupies a dominant position, the High
Court has taken a broad view of the relevant product market. It has ruled that
the market must be clearly defined, and that the Commission must show that
there has been a substantial elimination of competition.
VI. Mergers and Acquisitions
The Commission at first adopted a legal interpretation that Article 85 as a
rule does not reach corporate mergers and acquisitions, nor the formation of
joint venture companies. In general, the Commission indicated that mergers

'BURNS,

ANTITRUST DILEMMA: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD MODERNIZE THE ANTITRUST LAWS

(Central Book Company, Inc., Brooklyn, New York, 1969, page XVIII).
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and joint ventures were to be dealt with only under Article 86 to the extent that
they involve abuse of a dominant market position. This position appears to have
been modified, with the commission's statement that it still encourages mergers
in high-technology fields in order to improve the competitiveness of European
industry on world markets, while discouraging mergers in the consumeroriented industries.
In the ContinentalCan case 7 the High Court interpreted Article 86 as giving
the Commission the authority to prevent mergers. However, the problems of
defining the relevant market, then proving a substantial effect on competition
appears to have imposed obstacles of such a character that the Commission
has not instituted any other proceedings to prevent mergers.
In 1974 the Commission proposed a new regulation which would require
prior approval of all mergers or takeovers above a certain size. However, this
regulation has not been approved by the Council of Ministers.
In the area of joint ventures, the Commission allowed two competitors to
form a joint marketing subsidiary and distinguished such a permanent merger
from a temporary agreement not to compete, which would have violated Article
85. Applying Article 86 standards it ruled that the two companies together did
not have a dominant position after the merger. In the United States if an agreement by two competitors to have a joint marketing agreement would violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, formation of a joint marketing subsidiary would
probably be held a violation of both Section 1 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
This is an area where there is a definite conflict between United States and
EEC law. A United States Court or the FTC might prohibit a merger between
American and European firms even though it is lawful in Europe.

VII. Extraterritorial Scope
A principal difference between the EEC and American law is that the EEC
has no "foreign commerce" clause. The extraterritorial scope of the Treaty
is limited to conduct occurring outside the Common Market which causes the
prohibited internal effects. Conduct inside the Common Market which causes
only external effects cannot be reached.
In the Dyestuffs Cartelcase,8 the High Court upheld the Commission finding of
price-fixing violations against one British and three Swiss firms which were
domiciled outside the Common Market, but had subsidiaries in the Common
Market. It held the foreign parents legally responsible for effects inside the
Common Market, rather than the local subsidiaries. Here the basic theory of
jurisdiction is not very different from that used by a United States court in the
Swiss Watch case.

'2 CCH

COMMON MARKET REP.

12 CCH
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An American Webb-Pomerene Association selling to Common Market
buyers, but not "established" in the Common Market, might violate Article
85 despite a Webb-Pomerene exemption under American Law.
VIII. Intra-Corporate Conspiracy
Violations of Article 85 like Section 1 of the Sherman Act require two or
more persons to an agreement or understanding. In the United States there
has been considerable criticism of what has been described as the "bathtub"
conspiracy, or "intracorporate" conspiracy. The United States courts have
ruled that a parent corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary are two persons,
and that an agreement between them may violate the Sherman Act, but that
the same agreement or conduct is legal if the subsidiary is only a division of
the parent instead of a separate corporation. 9
The EEC has specifically rejected this concept. Instead it looks at the whole
enterprise, and if the subsidiary cannot take economic measures independent
of the parent, they are considered as a single enterprise.°
It is possible that if the EEC followed the United States law in the Dyestuffs
case, the foreign parents might not have been held liable for acts of their local
subsidiaries. However, the general approach of the EEC has been toward substance, and not form, and is more realistic.
IX. Patents, Trademarks, Know-How, Joint Research
In 1962 the Commission stated that Article 85(1) did not prohibit certain
restrictions in unilateral patent licenses of a type which it regards as within
the scope of the patent grant, including: limitations as to the field, quantity,
or territory of use (except that it cannot restrict imports into other states);
specifications of standards or restrictions of sources of supply if "indispensable
for a technically proper utilization of the patent"; grant-back of licenses or
improvement patents and know-how, provided the grant-back licenses are
non-exclusive and the licensor is mutually obligated; exclusive license agreements; and other provisions. In the United States the policy of the Department of
Justice is quite different. It is constantly attacking field of use restrictions and
restrictions on the source of supply.
The Commission encourages joint research and development, rather than
discouraging it as the United States does. While its policy is aimed at helping
small and medium-sized firms, it has been lenient with large firms and granted an

'Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Segram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
"Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Impore Export Co., 2 CCH CoMoN MARKET REP.

8149 (1971).
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exemption to the second- and fourth-ranked firms of a textile detergent, where
the top firm had eighty percent of the market.
In the United States the Department of Justice is opposed to joint research
by large firms, and has forced the automobile manufacturers to stop their joint
research for methods of reducing pollution caused by emissions from automobile engines.
X. Conclusion
From the foregoing, a clearcut conclusion emerges, so far as members of the
bar are concerned: Lawyers practising and businesses operating in the nine
member countries of the Common Market have a much easier task in conforming to EEC "antitrust laws" than their counterparts in the United States.
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